Abstract-Message authentication is an interactive procedure that allows Alice to send message M to Bob such that the latter is assured of its authenticity. Toward this, they usually share a secret key K. It is known that if the communication is noiseless, then after ℓ times of authentication, an adversary can succeed in an attack with probability 2
ℓ+1 , which quickly approaches 1 with ℓ. Lai et al. studied the authentication problem over a wiretap channel and presented a protocol that allows Alice to authenticate many messages without significantly increasing an attacker's success probability. Under their protocol, M is protected. In this paper, we consider the setting where M is not protected and is transmitted over a noiseless channel that can be seen and tampered by an attacker. Under this setting, we study the authentication framework which transmits a tag over a wiretap channel (besides sending M over the noiseless channel). We regard the transmission over the wiretap channel as an expensive resource and define two efficiency measures: authentication rate ρ auth and channel coding rate ρ chan . Improving both measures can improve the channel efficiency. With the secrecy capacity Cs of Csiszár and Körner in mind, one can trivially achieve ρ chan = Cs, which seems also the best possible result. However, we present a scheme with ρ chan > Cs when the main channel is less noisy. Our crucial point for this is that Bob does not need to recover the tag (as he can compute it from M and K) and so the protection for the tag is only to defeat the attack. ρ auth in our scheme employs purely cryptographic techniques and has very good performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Message authentication is an interactive procedure that allows Alice to send a source message M to Bob such that the latter is assured of its authenticity. This assurance should be provided through a mathematical proof. Toward this, we must first specify an adversary model. That is, what an attacker can do and how much power he has. A widely adopted model is to allow an attacker to play a man-in-the-middle attack. Under this, an attacker can send any message to Alice (or Bob) in the name of Bob (or Alice). Besides, any message from Alice (or Bob) must first go through the attacker, who can choose to block, modify or faithfully deliver it. Finally, the attacker is called successful if Bob accepts a source message M while Alice has never authenticated it. To prevent attacks, Alice and Bob usually share a secret key K. If the attacker tries to authenticate a source message to Bob before seeing any communication between Alice and Bob, it is called an impersonation attack. If the attacker tries to modify the message from Alice so that Bob accepts it as an authentication Dajiang Chen and Zhiguang Qin are with School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China. Email: dajiangchen2010@gmail.com; qinzg@uestc.edu.cn
Shaoquan Jiang is with Institute of Information Security, Mianyang Normal University, Mianyang 621000, China. Email: shaoquan.jiang@gmail.com of another source message, it is called a substitution attack. In this paper, we study the above general model where the attacker can play an arbitrary man-in-the-middle attack and see a polynomial number of message authentications.
An adversary power is usually defined in two classes: computationally bounded or unbounded. In the first class, an adversary can only run a polynomial number of steps. In the second class, an adversary can run an infinite number of steps. In this paper, we are interested in an unbounded adversary.
Usually, message authentication implicitly assumes the communication channel between Alice and Bob is noiseless. For a detailed treatment, see Simmons [11] and also Maurer [12] . However, under this model, any new authentication will lose some entropy of the secret key and the adversary success probability will increase. In fact, Maurer [12] showed that after seeing ℓ times of authentication, an adversary can succeed in an attack with probability at least 2 −H(K)/(ℓ+1) , which quickly approaches 1 with ℓ. In this paper, we investigate the authentication problem where the channel is noisy.
A noise in the real world usually plays an unwanted role. The task of digital communication is mainly to remove the effect of a channel noise. However, in 1975, Wyner [1] showed that Alice and Bob can share a secret key over a wiretap channel such that an attacker has no information about this. In his model, the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than one between Alice and the attacker. This result was generalized by Csiszár and Körner [6] . Since then, the secret sharing problem has been extensively studied in the literature (e.g., [13] , [14] , [15] ).
A. Related works
Even though secret sharing over noisy channels has been extensively studied, the attention to its sibling message authentication is far from enough. Korzhik et al [3] considered the authentication problem over a (noiseless) public discussion channel under the initialization from the noisy channels so that the sender, the receiver and the attacker hold some correlated data. So they essentially considered the authentication in the noiseless channel with a noisy initialization (or simply in the source model [8] ). Lai, ElGamal and Poor [10] considered the authentication over a wiretap channel X → (Y, Z). When Alice sends X, Bob will receive Y via a DMC W 1 : X → Y and the attacker will receive Z via DMC W 2 : X → Z. Alice and Bob share a secret K. The channel between the attacker and Bob is noiseless. They showed that as long as I(X; Y ) > I(X; Z), they can build an authentication protocol which can authenticate many source messages without significantly increasing an adversary success probability. From Maurer [12] , this is impossible when the channel is completely noiseless. Baracca, Laurenti and Tomasin [2] studied the authentication problem over MIMO fading wiretap channels. They protocol assumes no shared key between Alice and Bob. They only considered an impersonation attack and also assume an authenticated way for a sender to send some preliminary data to a receiver. This framework was further studied in [4] .
B. Contribution
In this paper, we consider an authentication model similar to Lai, ElGamal and Poor [10] , except that there is also a noiseless channel between Alice and Bob (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). This noiseless channel is used to transmit the source message M . However, there is no guarantee on the authenticity of messages over this channel. Practically, Internet, Telephone, or a wireless communication system with an error correcting coding can serve as this channel. We assume this channel can be freely used with no cost. Under this model, we study an authentication framework, in which Alice sends M over the noiseless channel and encodes an authentication tag T into codeword X n that will be sent over a wiretap channel, through which Bob receives Y n and the attacker receives Z n . The attacker can revise M on the noiseless channel into any M ′ . Bob receives M ′ from this channel. We define two efficiency measures: authentication rate ρ auth = |M| |T | and channel coding rate ρ chan = |T | n . Improving both measures can improve the efficiency of the wiretap channel. ρ auth is mainly determined by purely cryptographic techniques while ρ chan is determined by channel coding techniques. The latter is our main focus. With secrecy capacity C s of Wyner [1] and Csiszár and Körner [6] in mind, one can trivially achieve ρ chan = C s , which also intuitively seems to be the best possible result. However, we propose a protocol such that ρ chan > C s when Alice-Bob channel is less noisy than Alice-Oscar channel. Our crucial point for this is that Bob does not need to recover T (as it can be computed from M and K) and so the protection for T is only limited to secure against an attack. In our protocol, Bob will accept M ′ if the tag T ′ for M ′ is consistent with Y n (no matter T ′ = T or not). As Y n is originated from T , T is consistent with Y n . The nontrivial part of the construction is how to avoid the consistency of T ′ with Y n . We achieve this through random coding techniques. This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces basic concepts and results that will be used in this paper. Section III establishes some random coding lemmas. Section IV introduces our authentication model. Section V introduces our authentication protocol. Section VI proves an authentication theorem of our protocol. Section VII discusses the efficiency of our protocol. The last section is a conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper, we use the following notations or conventions.
• A random variable is denoted by an upper case letter (e.g., X, Y ); its realization is denoted by a lower case letter (e.g., x, y); its domain is denoted by a calligraphic letter (e.g., X, Y).
• Random variable is abbreviated as RV.
• x n denotes a sequence x 1 , · · · , x n of length n.
• For a positive integer s, define [s] = {1, · · · , s}.
• Probabilities P (X = x) and P (X = x|Y = y) are denoted by P X (x) and P X|Y (x|y).
• P x n (·) is a distribution over alphabet X, where for any a ∈ X, P x n (a) is the fraction of a in sequence x n . Similarly, P x n y n (a, b) is the fraction of (a, b) in sequence
• Entropy H(
PX (x)PY (y) ; conditional entropy
• RVs X 1 , · · · , X m form a Markov chain, denoted by
The following lemma is from [7, Lemma 1] , where our X in their lemma has the form f (X) for a function f . However, as f is arbitrary except |f (X)| ≥ 4, it is equivalent to theirs.
Lemma 1: [7] Let X and Y be two RVs over X and Y respectively. |X| ≥ 4. Let ∆ = SD(X|Y ; X). Then
A. ǫ-almost strongly universal hash function Universal hash function was introduced by Wegman and Carter [16] and further developed in [17] , [18] . We now introduce the ǫ-almost strongly-universal hash function.
Definition 1: A finite family of hash functions H from alphabet M to a finite alphabet T is ǫ-almost stronglyuniversal (ǫ-ASU) if the following holds
We remark that domain M is not necessarily finite but T and H are both finite. In this paper, H is indexed by elements in a set K. We can write H = {h k } k∈K . So |K| = |H| and h k is uniformly random in H when k is so in K. The following lemma will useful in security proof later.
Lemma 2: Let {h k0 } k0∈K0 be a family of ǫ-ASU hash functions from M to T. Let U, M ′ , M be RVs over U, M and M respectively s.t.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 3:
Let {h k0 } k0∈K0 be any family of functions from
Proof. We have
On the other hand, by Lemma 1,
By the convexity of f (x) = x 2 , we have
Independence between K 1 and T together with Lemma 1 gives the result (after reformatting the left side).
A construction of ǫ-ASU hashing function with a good input/output ratio will be used in this paper. Stinson [18] showed that there exists a scheme that compresses 2 s log q length to log q length. We state it as follows.
Lemma 4: [18] Let q be a prime power and let s ≥ 1 be an integer. Then there exists an s q -ASU hash function from M to T with key space K 0 , where
B. Discrete memoryless channel
A discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with input alphabet X and output alphabet Y is characterized by a stochastic matrix W = {W (y|x)} x∈X,y∈Y , where W (·|x) is the distribution of the channel output Y when the input is X = x, i.e., W (y|x) = P Y |X (y|x). In this case, we say X and Y are connected by channel W . If the input sequence is x n = x 1 , · · · , x n and the output sequence is
n is the encoding function, φ : Y n → T∪{⊥} is the decoding function, and ⊥ denotes a detection of error. For t ∈ T, f (t) ∈ X n is called a codeword. When a sender wants to send message t, he sends f (t). When a receiver receives vector y n ∈ Y n , he decodes it to φ(y n ). If φ(y n ) = t, an error occurs. The error probability of a code is defined e(C) = P (φ(Y n ) = T ), where Y n is the channel output with message T that is uniformly random over T.
C. Typical sequences
Let x n be a sequence over X. Then the distribution P x n (·) is called the type of x n over X, where P x n (a) is the fraction of occurrences of a in x n . For a type P over X, type set T n P denotes the set of all n-length sequences over X with type P. For example, for X = {0, 1, 2}, 6-length sequence x n = 022022 has type P x n = (1/3, 0, 2/3). Type set T 6 P for P = (1/3, 0, 2/3) consists of 6-length sequences 002222, 020222, 022022, 022202, 022220, · · · .
It is easy to see that |T
From [5] , a type P has the following property. Lemma 5: For any type P over X,
|X| for all a ∈ X, and further it holds that P x n (a) = 0 for any a with P X (a) = 0. The set of ǫ-typical sequences for X is denoted by
ǫ is a union of some type sets whose type is "close" to P X . Note the form of X could be arbitrary. Especially, it could be a vector such as X = (Y, Z).
Definition 3: Let X and Y be RVs over alphabet X and
|X|·|Y| for all a ∈ X and b ∈ Y, and further it holds that P x n y n (a, b) = 0 for any a, b with P XY (a, b) = 0. The set of conditionally ǫ-typical
. We now introduce some basic properties of typical sequences, which are well-known and can be found in existing information theory books (e.g. [9, Chap 1.2]).
Lemma 6: Let X 1 , X 2 , X be RVs over X and Y be a RV over Y. Then, 1. For any type Q of X n ,
2. There exists constant c > 0
where inequality ( * ) holds when n large enough.
There exists constant
where inequality (*) holds when n large enough. 4. There exists constants λ 1 and λ 2 > 0 such that when n large enough, for any
III. USEFUL LEMMAS
In this section, we present some lemmas that will be used to prove our main result later. The first lemma bounds
Lemma 7: Assume RVs X and Y are connected by DMC W : X → Y where P X = P for some type P . Let (Z n 1 , Z n 2 ) be a uniformly randomly pair from T n P . Then, there exists a constant c > 0 such that for any ǫ > 0, when n large enough,
Proof. For a fixed set S and its random subset B ⊆ S,
, where 1 B (y) = 1 if y ∈ B and 0 otherwise. Thus,
Notice that
for all a, b as P X = P . Summation over a implies
This further implies that
, which has a size at most 2
n[H(X|Y )+c
′′ ǫ] for some constant c ′′ > 0 by Lemma 6 (3). So Eq. (5) gives
for some c * > 0. Ineq (*) holds as Z n 1 , Z n 2 is a uniformly random pair in T n P . The lemma holds with c = 2c
′′ + c * + 1.
The second lemma essentially states that if we properly sample a subset A from T n P , then mostly likely A is an errorcorrecting code with an exponentially small error.
Lemma 8: Let P be a type over X. Assume integer ℓ ≤ 2 n(I(X;Y )−τ ) for some τ > 0 and RVs X and Y are connected by DMC W : X → Y with P X = P . Let A := {Z n 1 , · · · , Z n ℓ } (indexed randomly) be a purely random subset of T n P of size ℓ. Let (f, g) be a code with codebook A, where encoding f :
) and g(Y n ) =⊥ otherwise. Then, there exist constants λ > 0, ǫ 0 > 0 (not depending on ℓ) such that with probability at least 1 − 2 −nτ /2 (over the choice of A), we have e(A) ≤ 2 −nλǫ 2 , for any ǫ < ǫ 0 and when n large enough. Proof. We first compute
By Markov inequality, with probability
Denote the collection of such A by A. By Lemma 6 (3), there exists constantĉ > 0 s.
Note an error occurs only if
2 . Lemma follows with λ < λ 0 and ǫ 0 small enough (dependent on τ, c ′ , λ 0 ).
The lemma below states that a random subset A of T n P with |A| = ℓ is uniformly random over all subsets with size ℓ.
Lemma 9: For a type P and integer s, a subset A ⊆ T n P is sampled by including each x n ∈ T n P with probability 1/s. Then given |A| = ℓ, A is uniformly random over all possible subsets of T n P of size ℓ. Proof. Let N = |T n P |. Then, a particular set A of size ℓ is sampled with probability s −ℓ (1 − 1/s) N −ℓ , which does not depend on the specific element of A. So given |A| = ℓ, A occurs with probability 1/ N ℓ .
For s < T n P |2
−n(I(X;Y )−θ) , in the following lemma, we want to claim that for a random partition A 1 , · · · , A s of T n P , with high probability, most of A j 's are codes.
Lemma 10: Let RVs X, Y be connected by DMC W . For a type P and s = |T
as a code in Lemma 8 and A j with |A j | > 2 I(X;Y )−θ/2 as a code of error 1. Then, there exist constants λ > 0, ǫ 0 > 0 such that, with probability 1 − 2 −nθ/8+1 (over the randomness of partition), there are at most 2 −nθ/8 s possible j's with e(A j ) > 2 −nλǫ 2 , for any ǫ < ǫ 0 .
Proof. By Lemmas 9, given |A j | = ℓ, A j is uniformly random over all possible subsets of T n P of size ℓ. So by Lemma 8, given |A j | = ℓ ≤ 2 I(X;Y )−θ/2 , there exist constants λ > 0 and ǫ 0 > 0 (not depending on ℓ) such that, with probability 1 − 2 −nθ/4 , A j is a code with
for any ǫ < ǫ 0 . Here by symmetry of A 1 , · · · , A s , we have that ǫ 0 and λ are invariant with j. On the other hand, as E(|A j |) = |T n P |/s = 2 n(I(X;Y )−θ) , from Markov inequality,
Define Boolean function F (A j
Thus, by Markov inequality,
That is, with probability 1 − 2 −nθ/8+1 (over the randomness of a partition), 
IV. AUTHENTICATION MODEL
Communication Model. As shown in Fig. 1 , consider two channels W 1 : X → Y, W 2 : X → Z. Alice and Bob share a secret K that is uniformly random over a finite set K. They are connected by channel W 1 . That is, when Alice sends X ∈ X, Bob will receive Y ∈ Y with distribution P Y |X = W 1 (Y |X). Meanwhile, X will also be transmitted over a wiretap channel W 2 . A wiretapper Oscar receives its output Z ∈ Z with distribution P Z|X = W 2 (Z|X). The target of Alice is to send messages to Bob authentically. Toward this, we assume that the communication model follows the following framework. Let M be the message space and assume Alice wishes to authenticate M ∈ M.
• Alice sends M over a noiseless channel to Bob.
• Alice generates a codeword X n ∈ X n from (M, K) by first using function h : M × K → T to compute a tag T = h K (M ) and then using a keyed encoding function f K : T → X n to generate X n = f K (T ). Finally, she sends X n over a wiretap channel (W 1 , W 2 ).
• When Bob receives M ′ from the noiseless channel and We called such a protocol Π an authentication protocol. We use Π n to denote Π with codewords in X n .
Adversary Model.
The objective of the protocol Π is to authenticate a message M . When g K outputs 1, Bob agrees that M ′ is indeed from Alice; otherwise, he refutes this. An authentication failure could come from a completeness error or an attack from Oscar. If Π is designed properly, the completeness error is negligible. In our model, there is a DMC W 2 from Alice to Oscar. Oscar can also intercept and modify M over the noiseless channel. We assume the channel from Oscar to Bob is noiseless. We wish to capture the intuition that even if Oscar has seen many authentication instances and actively modified many messages over the noiseless channel, he still cannot cheat Bob to accept a fake message (i.e., it is not from Alice). Formally, the attack model is as follows.
I. Assume Alice have authenticated 
He succeeds ifb t = 1. Here (M t ,Ŷ n t ) is computed based on R and the information collected previously:
In the model, Oscar can arbitrarily interleave Type I attacks and Type II attacks. We use succ to denote the success in a Type I or Type II attack.
After introducing the adversary model, we now define the authentication property formally. It consists of completeness and authentication. Completeness essentially states that when Oscar does not present, Bob should accept M with high probability. Authentication states that under Oscar's attack authentication fails only with a negligible probability.
Definition 4: Protocol Π for wiretap channel W 1 : X → Y, W 2 : X → Z is authentically secure if the following holds.
1. Completeness. If Oscar does not present, then Bob rejects M with exponentially (in n) small probability. 2. Authentication. If the number of Type II attacks is polynomially bounded (in n), Pr(succ) is negligible. Remark. Restriction on the number of Type II attacks is unavoidable as Oscar can always choose a message M and send every possible y n to Bob. As Y n is a finite set, he can always succeed for some y n . We choose the number of Type II attacks to be polynomially bounded as each attack will involve Bob (as a receiver) and it is impractical to require him to be in a complexity class beyond a polynomial. Implicitly, the number of Type I attacks is polynomially bounded as it equals the number of messages authenticated by Alice.
Efficiency.
We regard the communication over a wiretap channel as an expensive resource. It is desired to minimize the use of it. For convenience of analysis, we define two efficiency measures. The first one is called authentication rate, defined as ρ auth = log |M| log |T| , which is the ratio of the source message length to the tag length. The second one is the channel coding rate for a tag, defined as ρ chan = log |T| n , which is the ratio of the tag length to the codeword length. In fact, both ρ auth and ρ chan are related to channel efficiency. Indeed, for a fixed ρ chan , a larger ρ auth implies that for the same source message, the tag length becomes shorter and hence the small number of channel uses. For a fixed ρ auth , a larger ρ chan implies that for the same n, a larger tag (hence a longer source message) can be transmitted. That is, increasing either ρ auth or ρ chan will improve the channel efficiency. In our protocol, we mainly focus on how to use coding techniques to improve ρ chan . ρ auth is mainly determined by cryptographic techniques.
V. OUR AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

A. Preparation
Let X, Y be RVs over X and Y respectively with a joint distribution P XY . Let (X n , Y n ) be n independent outputs according to P XY . In this case, (X n , Y n ) is called a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS) with generic variables X, Y . For A ⊆ X n , let P X n Y n be the joint distribution of (X n , Y n ), conditional on X n ∈ A.
. For any index set B, any collection of disjoint subsets {A b } b∈B with ∪ b∈B A b = A forms a partition of A. Of course, a partition of A does not depend on the index set B. The generality of B is only for our ease of presentation.
In other words, P Y n |b equals the marginal distribution of
A partition can also be characterized through a mapping. Specifically, for mapping σ :
Then {A b } b∈B forms a partition of A. On the other hand, given a partition {A} b∈B , we can define σ : A → B by σ(x) = b for all x ∈ A b . Thus, when the context is clear, we will simply call a mapping σ a partition of size |B| for A.
For any partition σ : A → B, σ(X n ) has a distribution induced by random variable X n . As σ(x n ) = b if and only if
If P X = P for a type P and A = T n P , Csiszár [7] showed that when k is not too large, there exists a partition σ that partitions T n P into k subsets of almost equal size so that σ(X n ) is almost independent of Y n . This is the following. Lemma 11: [7] DMC W : X → Y has input X and output Y , where X is according to a type P with P (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X. Then, for any τ > 0, there exists β > 0 such that when n large enough and k ≤ |T n P |2
−n(I(X;Y )+τ ) , T n P has a partition σ : T n P → {1, · · · , k} satisfying
where
Moreover, if σ is uniformly random among all possible partitions, then Eq. (15) holds, except for an exponentially small (in n) probability.
Remark. This lemma can be trivially generalized to the setting σ ′ : T For any set A, there are k |A| partitions of size k. One can sample a uniformly random partition σ : A → B by assigning σ(x) to a uniformly random element b in B for each x ∈ A, b ∈ B. This view will be used in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let X, Y, Z be RVs over X, Y, Z respectively such that P Y |X = W 1 , P Z|X = W 2 for DMCs W 1 , W 2 and that P X = P for a type P over X with P (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X. Assume I(X; Y ) > I(X; Z) + τ for some τ > 0. Then, for any integers I, J with
i C ij is a code (f j , g j ) for channel W 1 that has an exponentially small average error probability, where f j encodes a message m to the mth codeword in C ·j . 
where ω is a constant in (0, 1). Then, when n large enough,
Proof. Part I (for properties 1-2):
From our assumption, P X = P . Hence, P XY (x, y) = P (x)W 1 (y|x) and P XZ (x, z) = P (x)W 2 (z|x). Let
For any θ ∈ (0, τ ), let s 1 , s 2 be any integers with
Consider independent and uniformly random partitions of T n P , −n(I(X;Z)+(τ −θ)) ), there exists n 1 > 0, α 1 > 0 and β 1 > 0 such that the following holds with probability 1 − 2 −nα1 (over σ),
for n ≥ n 1 , where
is the explicit representation of partition σ 2 . By Lemma 10, there exist constants λ > 0 and ǫ 0 > 0 such that with probability 1 − 2 −nθ/8+1 (over σ), there are at most 2 −nθ/8 s 2 possible j's with e(A ·j ) > 2 −nλǫ 2 , for any ǫ < ǫ 0 .
Define Bad(σ) to the event: under σ, either Eqs. (16)(17) 
(as σ 1 , σ 2 are independent), we have
Similarly, we obtain
When Eq. (20) holds, Markov inequality implies the number of j's with
) by cutting a uniformly random subset of a proper size from A ij . After this, for j ∈ J ′ and i ∈ [
for every j ∈ J ′ . Let J be a uniformly random subset of J ′ of size J and let I = s 1 . Then, with probability at least 1 − 2 −nc+2 over σ (i.e., when ¬Bad occurs), we get J s.t.
1. For any j ∈ J, C ·j is a code (f j , g j ) with average error probability at most 2 −nλǫ 2 +1 as the cutting treatment on A ij can increase the average error probability by at most
So, for any
for β < β 1 (not depending on P J ) and n large enough. Note that lim n→∞ 1 n log(s 2 (1 − 2 −nθ/8 − 2 −nβ1/2 )) = H(X|Y ) + θ and θ is arbitrary in (0, τ ). So we can define J to be any value as long as 1 n log J < H(X|Y ) + τ. So J and I can take any value in the required condition.
So far we have proved that for 1 − 2 −nc+2 fraction of σ (denoted by set Good), uniformly random J from J ′ and uniformly random C ij from A ij will satisfy properties 1-2. Note the uniformity of J and C ij is unnecessary for property 1-2 and it is for the proof of property 3 in the following.
Part II (continue for property 3):
We continue to prove property 3, based on set Good, the uniformity of C ij , J above and properties 1-2. We will show that for a large fraction of Good, there exists some choice of J and C ij (in properties 1-2) that further satisfies property 3.
where set elements are ordered uniformly randomly. Then, for any fixed σ,
Further by condition (c) in property 3, we have
(i.e., I, (J, J ′ ) independent and each uniformly random and X n uniformly random in C IJ ). We now bound P Ŷ n ∈ T [W ]ǫ (C IJ ′ ) under this setting. By Lemma 6 (4),
for some λ 1 > 0, where
Let ξ be the randomness to select J from J ′ and to select C sd from A sd for all s, d. Let η be the randomness to order elements in C sd for all s, d. So far we have assumed ξ, η and σ are fixed. As J = J ′ (so u t = v t ′ ), it is not hard to see that, over the randomness of (ξ, η, σ), RV (u t , v t ′ ) for fixed (t, t ′ ) has a probability distance 2 −nγ from a uniformly random pair
′′ /2+1 fraction of σ, there exists ξ and η so that
Denote this set of σ by Good ′ . Then for σ ∈ Good ∩ Good ′ , from Eq. (24)(25), we know that Eq. (23) is bounded by 2
ω . Hence, property 3 is satisfied if
when n large enough. As a summary, for
′′ /2+1 fraction of σ, properties 1-3 are satisfied.
B. Construction
Now we describe our authentication protocol. Let W 1 : X → Y, W 2 : X → Z be the wiretap channel. Assume I(X; Y ) > I(X; Z)+τ for some τ > 0 and P X be a type P with P (x) > 0 for any x ∈ X. Let C ij , i = 1, · · · , I, j = 1, · · · , J be the subsets of T 
If Alice wishes to send message M ∈ M to Bob, they interact as follow.
1. Alice computes T = h K0 (M ), and randomly takes X n from C K1T . She sends M over the noiseless (but unauthenticated) channel. Through Oscar, M arrives at Bob as M ′ . Alice sends X n over channel (W 1 , W 2 ). As a result, Oscar receives Z n from channel W 2 and Bob receives
otherwise, he rejects. Here recall that g j is the decoder of code C ·j . Note: In Theorem 1, as f j encodes message ℓ to the ℓth codeword in C ·j , g j (Y n ) must decode to ⊥ or a codeword's index in C ·T ′ . As an index is 1-1 correspondent to its codeword, we assume g j (Y n ) decodes to ⊥ or the codeword itself.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the authentication property of our protocol. We begin with two lemmas.
Lemma 12: Let (K 0 , K 1 ) be uniformly distributed over K 0 × K 1 and M 1 , · · · , M J be J arbitrary messages in M authenticated by Alice. For j = 1, · · · , J, let Z n j be the output of W 2 when Alice sends X n j (the codeword w.r.t. M j ). Then, there exists β 2 > 0 such that when n large enough,
This concludes our proof. Lemma 13: Let K and V be RVs over K and V respectively. Then for any v ∈ V and any K v ⊆ K,
Proof. As SD(P X1 ; P X2 ) = 2 max A⊆X {P X1 (A) − P X2 (A)} for any RVs X 1 , X 2 over X,
Hence, the lemma follows.
A. Authentication Theorem
Now we prove our authentication theorem. It essentially states that under an appropriate setup, if Alice authenticates a polynomial number of messages and Oscar attacks polynomial times, then our protocol is authentically secure.
Theorem 2: Let I(X; Y ) ≥ I(X; Z) + τ , where Y, Z are the outputs of W 1 , W 2 with input X and P X is a type P with P (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X. Assume h : M × K 0 → T is an ǫ-ASU hash function with ǫ = min{2
−Ω(log n) , 2 n ω |T| } for some ω ∈ (0, 1) and
log n = ∞. Then, our protocol is authentically secure. Proof. From Theorem 1 (1) , the completeness of the protocol holds. Now we concentrate on the authentication property.
Let 
is independent of R and hence has the same distribution as when Oscar does not present. Hence, by Lemma 12,
, for a constant β 2 > 0 and any j ≤ ν.
According to the adversary model, Oscar can adaptively interleave the following attacks. We use bit b ℓ to denote the result of the ℓth attack (either type I or type II above) and set b ℓ = 1 if and only if he succeeds.
Assume the authentication of M j ℓ −1 by Alice has been completed before Oscar launches the ℓth attack. Then, the view of Oscar right before the ℓth attack is
, where a party's view is defined as his random tape R and the data received externally.
If the ℓth attack is Type I, then
If L is the upper bound on the number of attacks by Oscar, then his success probability is Pr ∨ L ℓ=1 b ℓ = 1 . As every successful attacker must experience the first successful attack, we restrict to an attacker who will stop after the first successful attack. So
Denote the original authentication game by Γ. Now we modify Γ to Γ ′ such that in Type I attack,
Consider an adversary Oscar ′ for Γ ′ who simply follows the code of Oscar by setting each (unknown) mis ℓ as 0 (even if it is 1). The view of Oscar ′ in Γ ′ differs from that of Oscar in Γ only if mis ℓ = 1 in Γ ′ for some ℓ. Thus,
As
, we only need to bound P (b ℓ (Γ ′ ) = 1) and P (mis ℓ (Γ ′ )).
Bounding P (mis ℓ (Γ ′ )).
We have the following lemma.
forms a Markov chain. This follows from two facts:
is completely determined by the noise in channel W 1 while this noise occurs after fixing (X
and hence is independent of the latter;
is determined by the randomness for sampling it from C K1Tj ℓ , which is independent of U ℓ M j ℓ .
By Theorem 1(3) with δ 1 from Lemma 2 and δ 2 from Lemma 3, together with the fact
(from triangle inequality), the lemma follows. 
Type I attack case:
In this case,
ℓ holds for at most one K 1 when K 0 and u ℓ are fixed. Thus, givenŪ ℓ = u ℓ , b ℓ = 1 holds for at most |K 0 | choices of
Bounding SD(P K|Ū ℓ ; P K ). Finalizing the bound on P (succ(Γ)). As U ℓ is part ofŪ ℓ , it follows that SD(K|U ℓ ; K) ≤ SD(K|Ū ℓ ; K). Notice SD(K|V ; K) ≤ √ 2ν ln 2 · 2 −nβ2/2 . By Lemma 14 and calculus analysis, there exists ς ′ > 0 and ω ′ < ω such that P (mis ℓ (Γ ′ )) is bounded by
Summarizing the bound on P (b ℓ = 1), we have P (b ℓ = 1) ≤ √ 2ν ln 2 · 2 −nβ2/2 + ℓǫ ′ . As P (succ(Γ ′ )) ≤ ℓ P (b ℓ (Γ ′ ) = 1) and ν is polynomially bounded, Eq. (30) gives P (succ(Γ))
for some ς ′′ > 0. This is negligible as L is polynomial in n and ǫ ′ is negligible. This completes our theorem.
VII. EFFICIENCY
In our authentication model, we have defined two efficiency measures ρ auth = log |M| log |T| and ρ chan = log |T| n . We know that improving either of the two measures can improve the channel efficiency. For our construction, let us realize h k for any δ ∈ (0, H(X|Z)) is legitimate if we let τ = H(X|Z) − H(X|Y ) − δ/2. Let |K 1 | = 2 log 2 n . It is easy to verify that under this setup, the security condition in our authentication theorem is satisfied as long as s ≤ 2 n ω for some ω ∈ (0, 1). This gives ρ auth = 2 s , approaching ∞ exponentially (in s) and log |T| n = H(X|Z) − δ. As δ can be arbitrarily small, ρ chan can be arbitrarily close to H(X|Z). In theory, we can take s = q ω for ω ∈ (0, 1) and so ρ auth is double exponential and this demonstrates a good authentication rate for our protocol. But M is too long such that Alice even does not have time to read it. So practically, taking s to be O(log n) is reasonable or taking s = 2 n ω for small n. Still, we can summarize the efficiency as follows.
Theorem 3:
There exists a setup for our protocol such that ρ chan = H(X|Z) − δ for any δ ∈ (0, H(X|Z)) and ρ auth approaches ∞ (double exponentially).
Our result ρ chan = H(X|Z) − δ is very interesting. Recall that in our protocol, we have to guarantee the secrecy of T while the secrecy capacity [6] for a wiretap channel with channel W 1 less noisy than channel W 2 is only C s = H(X|Z) − H(X|Y ) < H(X|Z) − δ for any δ < H(X|Y ). An intuitive explanation for this phenomenon is as follows. The secrecy capacity has two tasks: (a) the adversary has no information about the secret message; (b) the legal receiver Bob should be able to recover the secret message from the received vector in the wiretap channel. However, the secrecy of our tag T only needs to handle task (a) since Bob can recover T from M ′ in the noiseless channel (if M ′ = M ) while when M ′ = M , his job is only to realize and reject the authentication.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We considered an authentication problem, where Alice authenticates a source M over a wiretap channel (W 1 , W 2 ) under the assistant of a noiseless channel. Alice and Bob share a secret. We studied the framework, where Alice sends the source M over the noiseless channel and an encoded authentication tag T over the wiretap channel. We proposed an efficient authentication protocol, in which the channel coding rate beats the intuitively best possible result. An immediate open problem is how to construct a computationally efficient protocol (instead of channel efficiency studied in this paper).
